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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
CRIMINALISATION OF HIV TRANSMISSION: 
ANGLO-NORTH-AMERICAN COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES AND OPTIMAL REFORMS  
TO FAILURE OF PROOF DEFENCES 





The Law Commission have recently considered the broader ambit of 
reform of offences against the person precepts.1 This important review has 
directly examined whether, under a revised statute in this arena, bespoke 
criminal liability should apply to the transmission of disease, particularly 
in the context of the reckless transmission of HIV or sexually 
transmissible infections through consensual sexual intercourse.2 The 
recommendation promulgated is that the creation of any individuated 
offence attached to the transmission of HIV ought to be delayed pending a 
wider review of substantive principles, but that disease may fall within the 
wider definition of ‘serious injury’, under more general statutory reform 
proposals that can propitiously be advanced immediately.3 
 
A fundamentally different perspective to the criminalisation of 
transmission of HIV is advanced in this chapter. It is asserted that a de 
novo legislative response is urgently needed to specifically address 
thresholds of culpability and blameworthiness to ‘legitimate’ any potential 
inculpation, and to provide much needed clarity and certainty that ‘there is 
a troubling lack of predictability in an area of the law that cries out for 
                                                          
1 Law Commission, Reform of the Offences Against the Person (Law Com No 361, 
2015). 
2 ibid [6.1 - 6.146]. 
3 ibid [6.143 - 6.146]. 
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certainty’. There is an egregious failure under extant law to distinguish 
between levels of culpability and levels of (risk) of harm, and to 
consequentially avoid the danger of over-criminalisation for consensual 
sexual activity.4 In this context our focus is to consider a spectrum of 
legislative defences that ought to apply as failure of proof factorisations, 
and are individually exculpatory.5 The parameters of these failure of proof 
defences are examined against three posited questions: (1) If D1 uses a 
condom, is it imperative still to disclose their HIV status?; (2) If D1 has a 
non-detectable or a very low viral load, can non-disclosure still result in 
criminal liability?; and (3) Can a failure of proof defence apply if the 
sexual activity that D1 is engaging in is viewed as low risk? These 
postulations are extirpated in a comparative sense, reviewing extant 
English law in juxtaposition with Canadian precepts, and set against a 
myriad of beguilingly inconsistent current principles adopted across a 
panoply of US states. The aim is to charter a pathway towards a novel 
optimal reform model for statutory defences applicable to the transmission 
of HIV. Moreover, it is contended whether if D1 was justified in exposing 
V to the risk of infection without disclosing the condition should be a 
question for the jury in each particular case.6 The evaluation by jurors, as 
moral arbiters, should be with an awareness that the evaluation of 
recklessness or otherwise on the part of D1 may apply in certain defined 
situations at an earlier temporal individuation than consent.7 
 
A cogent rationale exists for autonomous individual determination to 
consent to the risk of becoming infected with HIV via consensual 
intercourse. This is not, nor should it be, the end of potential defences for 
D1and there are a number of other circumstances whereby it can be argued 
that an actor has behaved in a responsible manner to sexual activity, and 
no criminal liability should apply.8 If a defendant uses condoms, or is 
aware of the level of their low viral load, or knows that certain sexual 
activities pose less of a risk of transmission, then they should be able to 
utilise these defences, either disjunctively or conjunctively, to avoid 
                                                          
4 See generally, Jonathan Rogers, ‘Criminal Liability for the Transmission of HIV’ 
(2005) 64(1) Cambridge law Journal 20. 
5 See generally, Matthew Weait, Intimacy and Responsibility: The Criminalisation 
of the Transmission of HIV (Routledge-Cavendish, Abingdon 2007). 
6 See generally James Chalmers, Legal Response to HIV and AIDS (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2008). 
7 Udo Schuklenk, ‘ Should We Use Criminal Law to Punish HIV Transmission’ 
(2008) International Journal of Law in Context 277. 
8 Law Commission (No 361) (n 1) [6.19]. 
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criminal sanctions. Medical and scientific advances in our understanding 
of the disease, and effective prevention, should prompt a wider 
recategorisation of harm/risk of harm. 
 
The statistical probability attached to no transmission through safe sex, the 
advancement of anti-retroviral medication, and that certain types of sexual 
activity pose less of a risk of transmission, signify that there are more 
extenuating circumstances where the defendant should not be criminally 
responsible for his actions. Condom use, viral load, and certain types of 
sexual activity should be considered to be defences of ‘reasonable 
precautions’,9 where the defendant has attempted to reduce the risk of the 
virus being transmitted, and the risk was a reasonable one to take in that 
the risk of transmission is very small. The concomitant is that the issue of 
recklessness, and conscious advertence to the risk of harm on the part of 
the defendant, is presented at an earlier temporal individuation, prior to the 
consent question.10 Recklessness, or otherwise, may, thus, arguably be 
viewed through a legal prism where it is supererogatory with consent not 
affected by non-disclosure. These defences can be categorised as ‘failure 
of proof’ defences,11 in that condom use, viral load, and low risk sexual 
activities negate definitional elements of the offence (recklessness), and 
with an affirmative evidentiary onus on D1. The defendant as a practical 
matter may have to act affirmatively to present evidence on the issue of a 
given element of the offense; he may have certain evidentiary burdens. 
Robinson has categorised the ambit of such defences in the following 
broad terms: 
 
Failure of proof defenses consist of instances in which, because of the 
conditions that are the basis for the ‘defense’, all elements of the offense 
charged cannot be proven. They are in essence no more than the negation 
of an element required by the definition of the offense.12  
 
The focal inquiry should be whether a defendant, who uses a condom, has 
awareness of low viral load from a practitioner, or engages in low risk 
sexual activity, is reckless ab initio, in light of medical and scientific 
                                                          
9 Keith JM Smith, ‘Sexual Etiquette, Public Interest and the Criminal Law’ (1991) 
42 Northern Ireland Law Quarterly 309, 328. 
10 See generally, Sun Goo Lee, ‘Criminal Law and HIV Testing: Empirical 
Analysis of How at Risk Individuals Respond to the Law’ (2015) 14 Yale Journal 
of Health Policy Law and Ethics 194. 
11 Paul H. Robinson, ‘Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis’ (1982) 82 
Columbia law Review 199, 204. 
12 ibid 204. 
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developmental awareness. As previously stated, recklessness embodies not 
only that the individual actor knowingly adverts to and takes a risk, but 
also that the conduct was ‘unjustified’ in the circumstances that D knows 
or believes it to be. This factorisation should involve a wider pantheon of 
legitimate inculcations that extend to the social value of the activity in 
question (freedom to pursue sexual relationships), the level of harm risked, 
and probability of actual harm or consequential harm reduction.13 
 
The corollary is that awareness of one’s undetectable viral load per se may 
denote that an individual is not being reckless or acting intentionally as to 
harm through transmission, encompassing situations where a medical 
practitioner has confirmed that the actor was not infectious at the time of 
the sexual contact. It has been recently submitted that the risk in such 
circumstances is de minimis, practically non-existent in practice, with a 
study of 44,000 unprotected sex acts involving an HIV positive partner, 
but with an undetectable viral load due to treatment, revealing no cases at 
all of actual transmission;14 a stark iteration of positive scientific 
developments impacting on harm reduction. 
 
Furthermore, condom use per se as a defence is in line with public health 
initiatives, and utilising such precautions should be encouraged, given that 
they can significantly decrease the risk of transmission of the virus, and 
thereby encourage safe sex practices. It is proposed that if condom use can 
be a defence, then viral load, and certain types of sexual activity, should 
also be permitted as failure of proof categorisation defences, and all 
constitutively ejusdem generis. The defences share particulated 
commonalities in that the statistical probability of transmission through 
protected intercourse can be the same as, or more risky than, a low or 
undetectable viral load, and can be akin to certain types of sexual activity. 
Systematic review and meta-analysis have indicated, for instance, that the 
risk of transmission in vaginal sex decreases to 1 in 10,000 for the woman 
and 1 in 20,000 for the man.15 
 
The subsequent parts of this chapter are split into four sections, examining 
in turn the current relevance of condom use, low or undetectable viral 
                                                          
13 See generally, Scott Burris, ‘Do Criminal Laws Influence HIV Risk Behaviour? 
An Empirical Trial’ (2007) 39 Arizona State Law Journal 467. 
14 Law Commission No 361 (n 1) at [6.19]. 
15 Isabel Grant, ‘The Prosecution of Non-disclosure of HIV in Canada: Time to 
Rethink Cuerrier’ (2011) McGill Journal of Law and Health 7; and see generally 
Sun Goo Lee (n 10). 
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load, and types of sexual activity as a probative defence, or otherwise, 
within England, Canada and identified U.S. states. Extirpation of the 
individuated legal systems is conducted in a comparative review 
framework in order to promulgate an optimal statutory defence template 
for universal adoption and holistic incorporation: our new template 
reconceptualises individuated legislative responses that have been 
beneficially adopted in Iowa, Illinois and California. The aim is to present 
a cathartic panacea to incremental ad hocery and uncertainties that 
obfuscate extant law in terms of fault (recklessness) conjoined with 
appropriate defence parameters. It will also assist jurors as moral arbiters 
in terms of the determination of questions of fact, invoking systematic 
medical and scientific guidance appurtenant to probative exculpatory 
conduct. 
Failure of Proof Defences: English Law 
Condom Use as a Potential Defence to the Reckless  
Transmission of HIV 
Neither the common law of England, nor specific legislation, has 
determinatively stipulated that any defence, other than informed consent, 
can be raised in a sexual transmission of HIV case.16 Under extant 
precepts, as determined in Dica and Konzani, liability prevails for the 
infliction of grievous bodily harm (HIV) where four offence-definitional 
constructs apply: (i) transmission of the disease occurs, and exposure to 
the risk of infection is insufficient; (ii) D intends to inflict some harm upon 
V or consciously adverted (recklessly) to that risk; (iii) there was no 
prevailing consent on the part of V to the risk of infection; and (iv) a lack 
of honest belief on D’s part that V consented to such a risk. In Dica,17 
Judge LJ stated obiter that levels of precaution ‘may’ lead to a defence, 
and that it could be left for the jury to assess whether such protection 
would be sufficient: 
 
If protective measures had been taken by the appellant that would have 
provided material relevant to the jury’s decision whether, in all the 
circumstances, recklessness was proved.18  
                                                          
16 The Law Commission has recently considered the relevance of condom use in 
cases of HIV Transmission: Law Commission, Reform of Offences against the 
Person A Scoping Consultation Paper (Law Com SP no217, 2014). 
17 Dica (n 17) [11]. 
18 ibid [11]. 
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Further comments by Judge LJ in Dica seemed to indirectly indicate that 
other circumstances, including potentially the use of condoms, could 
present a defence: illustratively, consent to running the risk of becoming 
infected should not be invalidated where19 a Catholic couple,20 because of 
religious beliefs, are unable to use protective precautions, even though one 
may become infected by the other, and there is prior awareness that one 
partner is HIV+. The inference, albeit disjunctive, is that condom use may 
be utilised as a defence in other cases as the risk of transmission is 
significantly reduced, and the use of precautions in such circumstances 
would demonstrate that a defendant was acting responsibly. Emphasis was 
also made of condom use when referring to casual encounters.21 
Additional support for this proposition can be found in the Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS) guidelines,22 where it is acknowledged that 
prophylactic measures may implicate that no prosecution should ensue: it 
would be problematic to establish that the person using the precautions 
was acting recklessly.23 The CPS appears to concede that a defendant’s 
actions demonstrate responsible behaviour, the apotheosis of recklessness. 
It was, however, emphasised that it is the responsibility of the infected 
person to ensure that precautions are taken. The CPS guidelines also 
indicate that public policy rationalisations implicate that prosecutions will 
not take place when precautions have been used.24 The statement of Judge 
LJ in Dica and the CPS guidelines are rational proposals: an individual 
should be viewed in such circumstances as acting responsibly, and by 
acting responsibly D’s conduct may be justified. If the infected person is 
practising safe sex, then it would be extremely difficult for the prosecution 
to prove that he acted recklessly or intentionally. The counterpoise is that 
use of condoms is more effective in restricting the spread of the virus than 
informed consent: consenting to running the risk of infection offers no 
protection. 
 
                                                          
19 ibid [49]. 
20 ibid [48]. 
21 Dica (n 17) [47]. 
22 Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), ‘Intentional or Reckless Sexual Transmission 
of Infection’  
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/h_to_k/intentional_or_reckless_sexual_transmission
_of_infection_guidance/index.html#Safe> accessed 18th April 2015. 
23 ibid. 
24 ibid. 
Chapter Eleven 254 
Further support for this proposition has emanated from a number of 
academicians.25 As early as 1991, it was advocated that condom use could 
be a defence in these types of cases: it is ‘a proper and necessary 
concession to human nature’.26 To restrict an individual from becoming 
intimate with another person as a result of their condition, and allowing 
consent as the only means to circumvent liability, is a threshold that is set 
too high. There should be a different inculpatory-exculpatory gradation 
whereby an individual can still maintain intimate sexual relationships, 
particularly as stigma is still attached to those who are carrying the virus.27 
It is paradoxical to allow consent to act as a defence, but not the use of 
condoms. It is conceded that consent gives a person the opportunity to 
make an informed decision, and this is not an attempt to exclude consent 
as a defence, but consent does not reduce the risk as significantly as 
precautions. In concurrence with this proposition, it has been suggested by 
a number of commentators that precautions should be demarcated as 
higher than informed consent via disclosure, and that even attempted use 
of protective measures should be sufficient as a defence to transmission.28 
The effective use of protection should be a defence, but attempted use 
should not, as it is the equivalent to unprotected intercourse. In such 
circumstances, disclosure of HIV status should be a requirement to ensure 
that the party who is unaware has the opportunity to make an informed 
decision. A distinction must also be drawn, as Chalmers has articulated, 
between a moral duty and a legal duty, when referring to the use of 
precautions,29 and the disclosing of HIV status. Indeed, an individual has a 
moral duty to inform all of their prospective sexual partners, even when he 
is using protection, but a moral duty does not necessarily equate to a legal 
duty, a proposition that has been helpfully advanced by Bergelson in the 
wider context of the overarching parameters of consent. 
 
                                                          
25 Matthew Weait, ‘Criminal Liability for Sexually Transmitted Infections’ (2009) 
173 Justice of the Peace 45; Samantha Ryan, ‘Risk-Taking, Recklessness and HIV 
Transmission: Accommodating the Reality of Sexual Transmission of HIV within 
a Justifiable Approach to Criminal Liability’ (2007) 28 Liverpool Law Review, 
215. 
26 Smith (n 9) 328. 
27 Emily Mackinnon and Constance Crompton, ‘The Gender of Lying: Feminist 
Perspectives on the Non-Disclosure of HIV Status’ (2012) 45 University of British 
Columbia Law Review 407, 425. 
28 Dennis Baker, ‘The Moral Limits of Consent as a Defence in the Criminal Law’ 
(2009) 12 New Criminal Law Review 93, 114. 
29 James Chalmers, ‘The Criminalisation of HIV Transmission’ (2002) 28 Journal 
of Medical Ethics 160, 162. 
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If a defendant uses a condom, does that mean that he is being reckless or 
otherwise? It is arguable that even if the defendant used precautions, the 
Crown, in contrast to the CPS guidelines, may still establish that the 
defendant foresaw harm, and still took an unjustified risk.30 This, we 
contend, is unsustainable, as the use of condoms demonstrates that the user 
is seeking to alleviate the risk of transmission: responsibility rather than 
recklessness is the apposite standardisation.31 Recklessness is best defined 
as unjustifiable risk taking,32 and Judge LJ stated in Dica that recklessness 
is established, ‘if he knew or foresaw that the complainant might suffer 
bodily harm and chose the risk that she would’.33 The use of a condom 
establishes that the defendant is conscious that he may infect another, and 
as he has used precautions, it can be persuasively asserted that he has 
endeavoured to eradicate the risk of transmitting the virus, to a reducibly 
justifiable threshold. It is worth re-emphasising that statistical data, in 
reference to protected receptive vaginal intercourse, set the approximate 
risk in such a situation as extremely remote at one in ten thousand for the 
woman, and one in twenty thousand for the man. A failure of proof 
defence predicated on lack of mens rea is consequently adumbrated. The 
use of prophylactics indicates that the threshold for reckless behaviour has 
not been met: the risk has been so significantly reduced that D1’s actions 
should not establish culpability. 
English Law and the Relevance of an Individual’s Viral Load 
A number of proponents have suggested that actors with an undetectable 
viral load would not be considered reckless for transmission of HIV within 
the purview of English law,34 but strikingly, there is no judicial clarity on 
the matter.35 Confusion reigns supreme as to whether a low or 
undetectable viral load can act as a defence, or whether it ought to be 
exculpatory, as this has not been an issue that has been directly raised 
within our courts. The guiding appellate decisions in Dica and Konzani36 
                                                          
30 Simon H. Bronitt, ‘Spreading Disease and the Criminal Law’ (1994) Criminal 
Law Review 21. 
31 Ryan (n 25) 234. 
32 R v G [2003] UKHL 50. 
33 R v Konzani [2005] EWCA Crim 706 [2005] 2 Cr. App. (Judge LJ) [37]. 
34 James Chalmers (n 6) 146. 
35 The Law Commission has recently considered the relevance of viral load in 
cases of HIV transmission: Law Commission, Reform of Offences against the 
Person A Scoping Consultation Paper (Law Com SP no 217, 2014). 
36 R v Konzani (n 33) 14. 
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were concerned with unprotected intercourse, and the issue of consent. 
Probatively, a defendant who has a low or undetectable viral load would 
need to be fully aware of the level in order to raise it evidentially as a 
failure of proof defence. Support for this proposition has been cogently 
advanced by Smith, who submits that relying on medical advice should 
enable the defendant to evade responsibility.37 This would be achieved by 
regular testing of the level of the viral load. The World Health 
Organisation endorses such proposals by suggesting that the level of an 
individual’s viral load is one of the greatest risks in transmitting the virus 
to another person, and that reducing the viral load can be one of the most 
effective ways of diminishing the possibility of HIV transmission.38 The 
level of an individual’s viral load can be a deciding factor as to whether 
the virus will be transmitted: the lower the load, the less likely is the 
possibility of infecting another person.39 The viral load is reduced by 
taking antiretroviral treatment (HAART), and consistent use of the 
medication can decrease the load to an amount where it will be 
undetectable.40 A further, and more radical, endorsement has emanated 
from the Swiss Federal Commission for HIV/AIDS vis-à-vis the use of 
HAART, and the transmission of HIV. It was announced that if an 
individual does not have another sexually transmitted disease, complies 
with their HAART, and has had an undetectable load for at least six 
months, they will be unable to transmit the virus.41 In light of this 
factorisation, the CPS have acknowledged that the risk may be 
significantly reduced, and that it can be argued that the level of the viral 
load can be just as effective as condom use.42 This may denote that an 
individual’s viral load might need to be taken into practical consideration 
when deciding whether to prosecute an individual. If the accuracy of the 
                                                          
37 Smith (n 9) 328. 
38 World Health Organisation ‘Antiretroviral Treatment as Prevention (TasP) of 
HIV and TB: 2012 update 
WHO/HIV/2012.12’ (June 2012)  
<www.who.int/hiv/pub/mtct/programmatic_update_tasp/en/index.html> accessed 
20 April 2015. 
39 ibid. 
40 ibid. 
41 Pietro Vernazza and others, ‘HIV-positive individuals not suffering from any 
other STD and adhering to an effective anti-retroviral treatment do not transmit 
HIV sexually’ (January 2008)  
http://www.edwinjbernard.com/pdfs/Swiss%20Commission%20statement_May%2
02008_translation%20EN.pdf accessed 20 April 2015 
42 Crown Prosecution Service (n 22). 
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Swiss statement is to be assumed, then an undetectable viral load is even 
more effective than condom use in terms of effective harm diminution. 
England: The Transmission of HIV  
and the Type of Sexual Activity 
Although experts have recognised the complexity of providing a precise 
assessment of the risk of sexually transmitting HIV, it is accepted that 
some activities carry less of a risk than others.43 Statistical and meta-data 
analysis have revealed, for instance, that risk of infection from oral 
intercourse is extremely low, and risk of infection from unprotected anal 
intercourse is higher with a dissonance between whether the HIV partner 
is receptive / insertive. Where the HIV partner is the receptive participant, 
risk has been assessed at 4 in 10,000 for each act of unprotected 
intercourse. Even though there is no prescriptive formula for assessing the 
risk, it is evident that certain types of sexual activity can reduce the risk of 
transmitting the virus. As the risk of transmission fluctuates between the 
types of conduct, Bennett et al,44 propose that if an individual participates 
in low risk activities, these do not require a duty to inform the other person 
of one’s HIV status as the risk is reduced, and they are therefore acting in 
‘a responsible and morally justifiable way’.45 Thus, it is suggested that the 
type of activity in which the defendant partakes may signify that he has 
been acting in a responsible manner if he is aware that this would reduce 
the risk of infecting another person. The type of activity is important in 
assessing the probability of transmission. Although, as stated, it is 
recognised that unprotected anal intercourse, where the insertive partner is 
HIV+, is the most precarious activity,46 the risk of transmitting the virus 
becomes far more attenuated when assessing other types of interaction. 
Unprotected vaginal intercourse poses less of a risk47 when it involves 
male to female transmission. The risk is even more diminished when it 
encompasses potential transmission from unprotected female to male 
                                                          
43 Eric Mykhalovskiy, Glenn Betteridge and David McLay, ‘HIV Non-Disclosure 
and the Criminal Law: Establishing Policy Options for Ontario’ (August 25, 2010) 
http://www.catie.ca/pdf/Brochures/HIV-non-disclosure-criminal-law.pdf accessed 
20 April 2015. 
44 Rebecca Bennett, Heather Draper and Lucy Frith, ‘Duties to Forewarn Ignorance 
is Bliss? HIV and Moral Duties and Legal’ (2000) 26 Journal of Medical Ethics 9. 
45 ibid 12. 
46 Carol Galletly and Steven D Pinkerton ‘Toward Rational Criminal HIV 
Exposure Laws’ 2004 32 Journal of Law Medicine and Ethics 327, 328. 
47 ibid. 
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through vaginal intercourse. What ought to make the type of sexual 
activity a defence is that when the HIV+ partner is the receptive partner, 
the statistical probably of transmission through protected intercourse is 
thought to be the equivalent of female to male unprotected vaginal 
intercourse.48 If condom use is to be a defence, particularly as public 
health initiatives encourage their use, then certain types of sexual activity 
should also be included within our range of failure of proof bespoke 
defences. 
 
It is incongruous to homogenise different types of sexual activity, each 
carrying the same penalty, particularly when disparate types are clearly 
less likely to transmit the virus. Under extant law, the particular type of 
sexual activity is treated as irrelevant where transmission occurs, and 
where the complainant has not consented to running the risk of infection. 
The failure to evaluate perspicuitous consideration of sexual risk by D1 is 
counterfactual, and treating all types of sexual activity in the same manner 
in terms of thresholds of hard gradations, ‘would be irrational and 
unfair’.49 An individual who deliberately takes part in low risk activities 
ought not, and should not be, as culpable as a person who only partakes in 
high risk activities. There are suggestions that the type of sexual activity 
should not be taken into account, because someone involved in sexual 
intimacy that is a low risk may, on that particular occasion, be as likely to 
have transmitted the virus as someone taking part in high risk activity.50 
This is indefensible as it inappropriately blends together different levels of 
risk. This cannot be the case; if they were, then they would both pose the 
same level of risk on each occasion. It is the equivalent of stating that 
someone who has placed a bet on a 2000 to 1 horse winning a race is just 
as likely to win as someone who has put wager on the favourite on that 
occasion. The level of risk is calculated for a reason: the more remote the 
risk of transmission, the less likely that an individual will transmit the 
virus, and this factorisation needs remedial legislation to reflect effective 




                                                          
48 ibid. 
49 Ryan (n 25) 229. 
50 Matthew Weait (n 5) 176. 
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Canada: The Defences of Condom Use, Viral Load  
and the Type of Sexual Activity 
The Canadian position is that a defendant can be prosecuted for a variety 
of substantive criminal law offences51 if he does not disclose his HIV 
status to sexual partners. It is irrelevant whether the virus is transmitted. 
Some find it problematic to comprehend how there are a number of 
different charges that can be brought for the same conduct as a defendant 
never really knows what offence they can potentially commit.52 This 
invariably conflicts with the law being certain. The first case that was 
heard in the Supreme Court was Cuerrier,53 where the defendant was 
prosecuted under the aggravated assault provisions of the Canadian 
Criminal Code.54 Cuerrier engaged in unprotected intercourse with two 
women, and did not disclose that he was HIV+; this was despite the fact 
that he had been told, on a number of occasions, by health officials that he 
must use condoms, and disclose that he was carrying the virus. It was held 
that consensual intercourse without disclosure of HIV status was fraud if 
there is ‘a significant risk of serious harm’, and thus vitiated consent.55 
The majority judgment stated that fraud vitiating consent embraced not 
simply deceptions as to the nature and quality of the act itself, and the 
identity of the person, but that it extended to circumstances where there 
was a significant risk of serious harm. It was felt that a broader view of 
fraud was justified at common law: a particularised definition of fraud had 
been removed from the Canadian Criminal Code.56 
 
Cory J57 asserted in Cuerrier that the ‘proper use of condoms’ might 
reduce the risk so that it would no longer be considered ‘significant’. The 
utilisation of condoms could provide a defence to any charge that could be 
put before the courts, but emphasis was provided that each case should be 
dealt with incrementally on its own specific facts, and subsequent 
precedents have revealed a lack of clarity as to the parameters of this 
failure of proof defence. Prosecutors in Canada, at least prior to Mabior, 
seemed willing to provide specificity and lucidity, endorsing the use of 
                                                          
51 For example common nuisance: R v Summer 1989 98 A.R. 191, A.J. No. 78 to 
Murder: R v Aziga 2011 ONSC 4592, 2011. 
52 Isabel Grant (n 15) 9. 
53 Cuerrier [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371.  
54 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s. 268. 
55 Cuerrier (n 53) [128]. 
56 ibid [105]. 
57 ibid [129]. 
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condoms as an affirmative defence, and prepared to distinguish between 
protected and unprotected intercourse.58 
 
Their Lordships have subsequently adopted a straitened conjunctive dual 
threshold standardisation for exculpatory defences attached to HIV 
transmission/exposure in Canada. The Supreme Court decision in 
Mabior59 provided explicit guidance on condom use, and the duty to 
disclose: condom use will only provide a defence where the defendant in 
juxtaposition has a low viral load. A combination of dual bifurcatory 
factors are essential, with a higher defence threshold standardisation in 
non-disclosure cases, notwithstanding that the Supreme Court in Mabior 
concluded that further medical advancements and other matters could be 
taken into account. The decision sends out an inappropriate message, and 
can be seen as discriminatory to women as the odds of transmission from 
the recipient are greater than from the insertive partner. Furthermore, it is 
detrimental to public health initiatives, as the defendant who has used 
protection will still be susceptible to criminal sanctions. This now means 
that there is no overarching incentive for using a condom, and could 
increase reckless behaviour. Even more perplexing is the rather 
contradictory manner of the court in acknowledging that proper use of 
good quality condoms would mean that the virus will not be transmitted to 
another individual.60 If this is the case, then why criminalise protective 
consensual sexual intercourse? The judgment has raised more questions 
than answers vis-à-vis exculpatory-inculpatory standardisations: it 
confuses the culpability/blameworthiness contextualisation in terms of 
genuine risk of harm, obfuscates legitimate fault principles, and unduly 
widens the net of liability. It seems that unprotected or protected 
intercourse per se is now unimportant in Canada: it is no longer considered 
to be the demarcation line for prosecutions.61 
 
Prior to the decision in Mabior, condom use as an affirmative defence had 
received significant academic approval. It had legitimately been suggested 
that allowing condom use is a more effective way of reducing 
transmissions than relying on disclosure.62 There is also a consensus of 
                                                          
58 McGregor  2008 ONCA 831, 240 CCC (3d) 102 [7]; R v Wilcox 2011 QCCQ 
11007 (available on CanLII). 
59 Mabior [2012] SCC 47. 
60 ibid [98] 
61 This has been affirmed in a number of cases for an example see R. v. Felix, 2013 
ONCA 415 [48]. 
62 Grant (n 52) 19. 
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opinion that it is generally accepted that condom use is one of the most 
widely recognised ways to prevent transmission.63 The promotion of 
condom use as a failure of proof defence is particularly relevant when a 
significant number of infections take place before the actor is aware that 
they are carrying the virus.64 As previously stated, consent will not protect 
an individual from the risk of infection, but condom use can be an 
effective way of protecting against infection. An individual who uses 
condoms is being conscious of his own, and others’, sexual health. By 
using such protection, it can be seen that there is a genuine attempt at 
reducing the risk of not only HIV, but a number of other sexually 
transmissible infections. If criminalisation of sexual exposure to HIV does 
not act as a deterrent, then allowing the use of condoms at least sends a 
message that is consistent with health policies,65 and as a matter of policy, 
using protection should be encouraged under the auspices of legislative 
policy inculcations. 
 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has clarified that a low viral load per se will 
not present an affirmative defence in non-disclosure cases.66 It has been 
determined that the ambit of any failure of proof defence, predicated on 
low/non-detectable viral load, poses probative evidential difficulties.67 If 
this is correct, then why conjunctively enable a low viral load conjoined 
with condom use to be a supererogatory defence?68 The outcome in 
Mabior demonstrates that a low viral load in isolation is irrelevant, but the 
Supreme Court appears to indicate that, solipsistically, an undetectable 
load may still be relevant in other factual circumstances.69 However, in 
D.C. the Supreme Court affirmed that an undetectable viral load could not 
present a bespoke defence.70 Lower courts, however, have not strictly 
applied the test that was set out in Mabior. In the recent case, for example, 
of R. v J.T.C.,71 the Provincial Court of Nova Scotia has affirmed that, 
providing there is cogent expert evidence of the remoteness of the 
possibility of infection, a defendant will not be considered to have 
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‘criminally exposed’ another through unprotected intercourse. Judge 
Campbell stated that ‘the Supreme Court of Canada did not intend in R. v. 
Mabior and R. v. D.C. to impose evidentiary findings on trial courts that 
are incompatible with the evidence actually before those courts’.72 Dr 
Schlech, the expert in the case, proposed that the odds could be one 
million to one of the virus being transmitted with an undetectable viral 
load.73 It was accepted by Judge Campbell that his decision was specific to 
that case, and there was no realistic possibility of the virus being 
transmitted by the defendant. Significantly, there was disregard for the 
binary defence standardisation established in Mabior, and in R. v J.T.C., 
Judge Campbell clearly preferred scientific estimations and guidance to 
judicial precedent. 
 
It is evident that the lower courts within Canada, adopting and adapting 
more nuanced perspectives to failure of proof defences, are recognising 
that understanding of viral loads has developed to such an extent that the 
viral load needs to be taken into consideration when assessing the risk that 
is posed.74 When there is an undetectable viral load, it is arguable that 
harm is not foreseeable,75 and there should be no prosecutions when a load 
is at that level.76 It is inexplicable to contemplate that the defendant with a 
low or undetectable viral load would need to disclose their status when the 
risk of transmission is negligible or non-existent in such circumstances.77 
The real issue with low/non-detectable viral load is that not everyone is 
able to take the appropriate medication, but this does not justify 
disavowing it as a defence. When the viral load is at an undetectable or 
low level, any non-disclosure requirement ought not to be affected. 
 
Concerns have been raised about the accuracy of viral loads, and what is 
not detectable one day does not mean it will remain the same the next.78 
This was addressed by the Supreme Court in Mabior when deciding that 
viral load could not be used in isolation,79 but developments within the 
lower courts appear to indicate otherwise.80 A further issue that has been 
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identified is that defendants may begin to make their own ‘risk 
assessments’,81 but to do this, the defendant would need to know the level 
of their viral load. To be able to know that level would require the 
appropriate test and medical advice. Grant has stated that the viral load 
factorisation can lead to problems regarding the burden of proof.82 
Canadian courts, before the Supreme Court decision in Mabior, had been 
using their good sense by looking at average viral loads, and stating that it 
is an evidential rather than legal burden when raising the issue of viral 
loads.83 When precise information was unavailable, the courts had been 
willing to accept average viral loads for determining whether there was a 
significant risk, and in such circumstances, it would be an evidential 
burden of showing that they had a low or undetectable viral load over that 
period of time.84 The position has been clarified by the Supreme Court in 
Mabior to the extent that it is an evidential burden that also conjunctively 
requires condom use.85 
 
A further Canadian development can be seen in R. v J.A.T.,86 where 
statistics regarding the type of sexual activity were utilised in order to 
acquit the defendant. It was proposed that whether the defendant’s conduct 
means there is a significant risk of harm, needs to be assessed by the type 
of sexual activity, and the statistical probably of transmitting the virus. In 
that case, the receptive partner was HIV+, and in such circumstances it 
was accepted that the risk was insufficient to be considered a serious risk 
of harm.87 Their Lordships also heard expert opinion that stated that this 
type of sexual activity was equal to protected intercourse where the 
insertive partner had the virus.88 This case embodies the fundamental 
issues attached to any inculpatory-exculpatory threshold gradation: it 
indicates that a defendant may still have a defence when he participates in 
certain sexual activities. A pressing need exists for clarity on where the 
demarcation point lies. The type of sexual activity can no longer be used in 
isolation; it may, however, be utilised with either protected intercourse or 
viral load. There is no guidance on these matters: clear unequivocal 
direction is required, and this was not achieved by the Supreme Court in 
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Mabior.89 Courts have subsequently addressed the relevance of low risk 
sexual activities and a defendant’s viral load. In McKonnen,90 for instance, 
the Court of Appeal in Nova Scotia seemed to accept that oral intercourse 
and a low viral load would not pose a realistic possibility of the virus 
being transmitted. There has also been an acceptance of a defence based 
upon oral intercourse and an undetectable viral load before the Superior 
Court of Justice in Ontario.91 In this latter case, there was confirmation 
that a defence based upon low viral load and oral intercourse did not pose 
a realistic possibility of the virus being transmitted. Expert evidence 
presented in Murphy92 was to the effect that the odds of becoming infected 
could be as high as one hundred thousand to one.93 It seems that there is an 
acceptance of oral intercourse and a low or undetectable viral load acting 
as a defence, but there is no clarity as to whether low risk sexual activities 
can be used disjunctively, beyond the conjunctive requirements of condom 
use/low viral load. 
 
Grant has submitted that if condom use and viral load are to be 
conjunctive defences, then why not the type of sexual activity as a 
bifurcated stand-alone failure of proof type defence?94 The type of sexual 
activity may also play a pivotal role in ascertaining whether disclosure is 
required, and each case is dealt with in an ad hoc manner by lower courts, 
rather than on evolving common law precepts as declared by the Supreme 
Court.95 This means that any combination of the three suggested defences 
may be used to lower the realistic risk of transmission. Such a proposition 
may lead to further unpredictability as cases will still be relying heavily on 
expert evidence to ascertain whether there is realistic possibility of 
transmission.96 Mabior left the door open for individuated solipsistic 
determinations, stating that medical advancements and ‘other risk factors’ 
may mean that there is no ‘realistic’ possibility of transmission.97 Issues 
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remain to be addressed over the accuracy of expert evidence,98 and it is 
still questionable whether expert opinion becomes a ‘numbers game’. 
 
Canadian law, in truth, remains inherently uncertain in a variety of 
dissonant respects in terms of gradation of harms that are viewed as 
sufficient to negate consent and endanger life. Recent lower court 
decisions, out with earlier Supreme Court analysis in Cuerrier and 
Mabior, reveal individuated and solipsistic determinations related to types 
of sexual activity interdependent on conflicting expert evidence and 
individual risk assessment. The dual threshold criterion of condom use, 
conjunctively aligned with low viral load, has become attenuated, and 
appellate courts have recently been predisposed to leave matters to jurors, 
as moral arbiters, to evaluate the significance and level of risk attached to 
individual conduct. 
U.S. State Law Perspectives: The Failure  
of Proof Defences of Condom Use, Viral Load  
and Type of Sexual Activity 
The United States: Condom Use as a Defence 
The U.S. Presidential Commission recognised that the use of precautions 
ought to be promoted and adapted as a defence: the recommendation 
presented was that condom use should correlate to a complainant 
consenting to protected intercourse with an HIV+ individual.99 The 
response at state level, however, to this directed recommendation has 
proved eclectic, and diversely nuanced perspectives are currently in 
operation. Our research indicates that dissonant approaches can be 
compartmentalised into three classifications: (1) a limited number of U.S. 
states have legislatively enacted the recommendations of the Commission 
and facilitated the use of precautions as a defence, but only conjunctively 
when their use is aligned with  the informed consent of the complainant; 
(2) other statutes have exceeded the recommendations of the Presidential 
Commission and approved condom use disjunctively and singularly as the 
basis of a defence against criminalisation; and (3) finally, there are a 
limited number of states that reject condom use as a defence to any 
specific criminal sanction. The allowance of condom use as a defence 
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corresponds to public health initiatives within the United States, and 
accedes to the harm principle by recognising the relevance of the 
probability of the risk of serious harm.100 The facilitation of the defence is 
further cemented by various studies that denote that using such measures 
reduces the risk of the virus being transmitted by 95%, in comparison to 
unprotected intercourse: utilisation significantly reduces the risk of 
infection.101 A defence of this type also achieves a legitimate equipoise in 
terms of balancing rights/responsibilities attached to sexual intercourse, 
constitutively ‘minimising legislative intrusion into intimate sexual 
activity.’ 
 
Missouri is the only U.S. state that has expressly disavowed the 
Commission’s recommendations: a legislative framework has been 
assimilated that explicitly stipulates the exclusion of condom use as a 
defence.102 Certainty is promulgated within the constrained Missourian 
framework, but their deontological and mechanistic bright line 
exclusionary provision disregards any theoretical foundation or policy 
basis for the disaggregation of condom use as an affirmative defence. No 
consideration is given to the probability of harm occurrence or culpability 
thresholds of the ‘criminal’ actor, and the framework is contrary to, and 
out with, beneficial public health initiatives.103 The Missourian legislative 
offence is centred on an exposure to the virus definitional construct, but it 
is evident that the legislators did not perceive the importance of balancing 
the social utility of sexual interaction, the magnitude of harm and the 
probability of harm. The exclusion of condom use as a defence conveys an 
egregious message that their utilisation is immaterial to individuals who 
are already infected with the virus. 
 
Generally, in the absence of an explicit legislative inclusion of condom use 
as a bespoke failure of proof defence, it will not be accessible to a 
defendant at common law.104 The assertion by a defendant that he has 
utilised protective measures, and that an affirmative defence ought to 
apply, have been disregarded by a number of appellate courts. By way of 
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illustration, in State v White,105 the Supreme Court of Arkansas refused to 
countenance the defendant’s contention in relation to condom use, out 
with any legislative response to the issue, and it was determined that 
sufficiency of probative evidence favoured the State for inculpation.106 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed that the offence was committed 
once a defendant had sexual intercourse with an unsuspecting 
complainant, and with liability predicated on non-disclosure:107 statutory 
liability extended to unprotected and protected intercourse out with 
informed consent. The failure  to facilitate condom use as an affirmative 
defence is detrimental to public health awareness and conscious 
advertence to risk:108 Perone has cogently argued that U.S. states that are 
stultifying the defence of condom use are ‘indirectly’ suggesting that 
protective measures are ineffective in preventing the virus being 
transmitted. 
 
Appellate courts in other U.S. states have expressly declined the 
opportunity to consider and deliberate the potentiality of condom use as a 
defence, and disavowed the import of scientific and medical data analysis 
in terms of genuine risk. In State v Gamberella,109 a case heard in the 
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, the court categorically refused to explore 
the defence, and the judiciary were hostile to the defendant’s submissions 
in relation to the probative evidentiary relevance of ‘intentional’ utilisation 
of protective measures. This disavowal in Louisiana of any proof of fault 
defence is counterintuitive and counterfactual, especially as the extant 
legislative provision places primordial offence-definitional construction on 
the fault element: a defendant must act with ‘intention’ in relation to harm, 
and correspondingly, the use of condoms may have negated that intent. 
 
The judiciary took a contrary position in State v Gamberella, and 
determined that the intent of the defendant was established at a rudimental 
level when he knew that he was HIV+, and that he could transmit the virus 
to another, without elaboration of the temporal individuation of fault 
occurrence or harm negation. Even where the defence has been 
presumptively denied as an evidentiary predicate, the analysis provided 
                                                          
105 State v White 370 Ark. 284 (2007). 
106 ibid 289. 
107 ibid 290. 
108 Angela Perone, ‘From Punitive to Proactive: An Alternative Approach for 
Responding to HIV Criminalization that Departs from Penalizing Marginalized 
Communities’ (2013) 24 Hastings Women's Law Journal 363. 
109 State v Gamberella, 633 So.2d 595 (La. Ct. App. 1993). 
Chapter Eleven 268 
has been confused, convoluted and, on occasions, Janus-facing: the 
Criminal Appeals Court of Tennessee, for instance, in State v Bonds110 
refused to countenance the defence, but in an opaque and skewed 
delineation made implicit reference to the relevance of harm gradations: 
 
[T]he majority of the convictions were upheld without evidence of an 
“exchange” of bodily fluids. Indeed, our prior case law’s emphasis on 
“unprotected” sex supports the conclusion that “exposure” means simply to 
submit to a risk of contact with bodily fluids, such a risk being 
substantially more prevalent in unprotected sex than when some form of 
prophylactic is utilized.111 
 
The availability of condom use as a defence, or otherwise, within 
Tennessee may require further reconsideration following the recent 
Supreme Court of Tennessee’s decision in State v Hogg.112 The case did 
not directly concern condom use per se, but it was stated therein that the 
risk of transmission must be ‘more definite than a faint, speculative 
risk’,113 and it may subsequently be argued that the risk of infection can be 
speculative if protective measures have been used. 
 
A number of U.S. commentators have rejected condom use as an 
affirmative defence, and it is instructive to evaluate the perspectives 
advanced. Markus114 has propounded that condom use does not 
conclusively prevent impeding transmission, and should, therefore, not act 
as an evidentiary defence.115 Schulman has specified that because of the 
deficiencies that are intrinsically linked to condom prevention, these 
protective measures should not be considered to be an alternative 
defence.116 Deficiencies can be identified with condom use, but this should 
not superimpose a conclusive rationale for excluding their use as an 
affirmative defence. There has been no case before the U.S. state courts 
where the virus has been transmitted when the defendant intentionally and 
reasonably used a condom. Studies also demonstrate the effectiveness of 
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condom use when they are correctly and consistently used as a protective 
measure.117 Under those conditions, they significantly reduce the risk of 
the virus being transmitted. Criminalisation should not include those who 
have used condoms, and it is unrealistic to assume that there are activities 
where it is certain that transmission cannot transpire, something that other 
states appear to have accepted. 
 
The use of protection forms the basis of an individuated statutory defence 
within a minority of U.S. states.118 Illinois has accommodated condom use 
in a bespoke affirmative provision that may be beneficially adopted within 
other criminal justice systems: 
 
(a)  A person commits criminal transmission of HIV when he or she, with 
the specific intent to commit the offense: 
 
(1)  engages in sexual activity with another without the use of a condom 
knowing that he or she is infected with HIV (emphasis added). 
 
Condom use has been prescriptively incorporated as a defence within the 
legislative framework of Illinois, and this response has been replicated in 
California, Iowa and Minnesota. An appropriately worded statutory 
schema has been adopted in this panoply of jurisdictions, establishing a 
definite and translucent defence, consequently providing certainty and an 
effectual safeguarding of interests. It represents the obverse of the 
delimiting strictures inappropriately applied in Louisiana and Tennessee. 
 
Interestingly, the appellate courts in a number of other U.S. states have 
determined that the use of protective measures can negate the mens rea of 
the offence to provide a failure of proof defence: in effect, ‘judicial’ 
legislation has been interposed as a remedial panacea where statutory 
response is silent or deficient. In State v Richardson,119 a case heard in the 
Supreme Court of Kansas, it was asserted that use of condoms may be 
relevant when considering whether the defendant had formed an 
‘intention’ to expose the complainant to the virus:120 
 
[Kansas’ Statute] not only requires proof that the defendant knowingly 
engaged in sexual intercourse, but it also requires evidence of a specific 
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intent to expose the defendant’s sexual partner to a life-threatening 
communicable disease. Thus, under our statute, condom use can be 
germane to the defendant’s specific intent.121 
 
The use of condoms ought to exculpate a defendant when inculpation is 
based upon a fault element of intention (or recklessness). Their use is 
indicative in ascertaining whether the defendant intended to transmit the 
virus.122 A defendant who has used protective measures has endeavoured 
to remove/reduce the risk of the complainant becoming infected with the 
virus. Minahan, however, contrary to our standpoint, iterates that defence 
enablement may, ‘create a false sense of security’ on the part of that 
complainant, as the expectation is upon the infected party to reduce the 
risk.123 This is counterintuitive and does not accord with the realities of 
sexual intimacies. Moreover, it is irrational for an infected individual not 
to use a condom if he knew that their use may form the basis of a defence 
or negate the mens rea of the criminal sanction. 
 
A distinctive cadre of U.S. states have conjunctively facilitated the use of 
condoms as a defence, aligned with disclosure of their sero-status to a 
prospective sexual partner. In North Carolina and North Dakota, the 
legislative framework explicitly stipulates words to that effect, thereby 
connoting condom use, in isolation, to be irrelevant.124 It seems that the 
provisions within these states are following the recommendations of the 
Commission, but are placing an undue burden upon a defendant to disclose 
their status, even when the risk of transmission is significantly reduced. 
There are suggestions that disclosure and condom use serves the purpose 
of protecting those who are unsure as to what they have consented.125 This 
concern would be eradicated if a fully informed consent was expected, as a 
potential sexual partner needs to be fully aware of the risks associated with 
having unprotected intercourse with an infected defendant.126 
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The combined statutory defences of condom use and disclosure have 
proponents: Sullivan and Field advocate the use of precautions and 
disclosure in the following terms: 
 
It more clearly imposes on persons with AIDS and AIDS carriers 
affirmative duties, as a condition of engaging in sexual intercourse, to 
disclose their condition to their sexual partners, to obtain their partners’ 
knowing consent, and to use precautions such as condoms. Such a statute 
has a more realistic chance of influencing behavior, because it permits a 
person to pursue a sexual relationship if he complies with these affirmative 
duties.127 
 
Sullivan and Field do not consider our preferred optionality, whereby in 
specific circumstance an individual should be given the opportunity to 
consent to unprotected intercourse, even when that would increase the risk 
of transmission. The facilitation of a hard paternalistic approach to 
unprotected sexual liaisons precludes any right to intimate connection, 
procreation, and the autonomy of the prospective partner. The allowance 
of a defence of condom use in isolation would also allow individuals to 
pursue sexual relationships, and would act as a greater incentive to 
individuals to use protective measures. Newman legitimately recommends 
a defence that is based upon protective measures as their use is an 
important factor that assists in reducing the risk of infection, even if it has 
an impact upon the frequency of a defendant disclosing their status.128 The 
defence of condom use ought to be an alternative to, but not a replacement 
of, disclosure. If the ultimate aim is to encourage condom use, then 
indubitably a defence of protective measures affords a more solid 
foundation that encourages individuals to be proactive in their use. By 
allowing condom use in isolation would provide a further juncture for a 
defendant to act responsibly. If every individual who has contracted the 
virus used a condom, under the principle of unity, the virus would 
eventually be eradicated.129 Therefore, consent and condom use should be 
distinctive defences, as should an undetectable viral load. 
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U.S. State Law and the Risk of Transmission:  
The Relevance of Viral Load 
The U.S. Presidential Commission proposed that states enact legislation 
that would criminalise conduct that, ‘(…) according to scientific research, 
is [sic] likely to result in transmission of HIV’.130 The level of a 
defendant’s viral load may be relevant to the likelihood of risk of the virus 
being transmitted, and may form the basis of another defence. Statistical 
studies have revealed that if the defendant’s viral load is consistently 
undetectable for a period of six months, then the virus cannot be 
transmitted.131 A low viral load also significantly reduces the risk of the 
virus being transmitted.132 The majority of U.S. states, however, have not 
considered, or continue to disregard, the relevance of a defendant’s viral 
load. Only two states have promulgated statutory responses to the 
criminalisation of HIV transmission that potentially allow examination of 
probative relevance of a defendant’s viral load, although this has also 
occurred on a limited number of occasions at common law.133 By way of 
contrast, the preponderance of state legislators have taken an alternative 
stance, disregarding the probability of harm, and with a primary focus 
upon magnitude of harm precepts. 
 
Idaho’s statutory response provides a rare exception in crystallising the 
potential for an affirmative defence of an undetectable viral load.134 The 




… (b) Medical advice. It is an affirmative defense that the transfer of body 
fluid, body tissue, or organs occurred after advice from a licensed 
physician that the accused was non-infectious.135 
 
The statute clearly enables a defence to apply when the virus cannot be 
transmitted as the actor was non-infectious; however, no specification or 
delineation applies to the actual contours of undetectable viral load. Any 
potential defence is heavily reliant upon a medical professional confirming 
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that the defendant cannot transmit the virus. Disappointingly, trial courts 
in Idaho have adopted a particularised reading of the ambit of any defence, 
disregarding section import, by allowing a defendant with an undetectable 
viral load to simply plead guilty.136 The provision, therefore, appears to be 
devoid of any substance. This disregard of probative evidence is 
particularly disappointing when the wording of the statute is clear and self-
evident. Criminalising a low or undetectable viral load, Waldman denotes, 
is ‘an incident of the accident fallacy’.137 The generalisation of the law is 
failing to take into consideration the specifics of an individual case and, 
therefore, the law is being ‘inappropriately applied’.138 This is at its most 
evident in Idaho, out with statutory reforms. 
 
Recent common law developments in Iowa have indicated that the 
defendant’s viral load will be a relevant factor in ascertaining whether 
there is a risk of the virus being transmitted. Judicial legislation has 
triumphed in this regard over antediluvian state legislation: the former 
legislative framework of Iowa was to the following effect: 
 
1. A person commits criminal transmission of the human 
immunodeficiency virus if the person, knowing that the person's 
human immunodeficiency virus status is positive, does any of the 
following: 
a. Engages in intimate contact with another person. 
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b.  “Intimate contact” means the intentional exposure of the body of 
one person to a bodily fluid of another person in a manner that 
could result in the transmission of the human immunodeficiency 
virus.139 
 
The lack of an appropriately worded legislative framework in Iowa, 
beyond the rigid schema above, was highlighted in a number of important 
judicial pronouncements. In State v Rhoades,140 a case heard in the 
Supreme Court of Iowa, it was stressed that the judiciary could no longer 
take judicial notice of the defendant having the potential to transmit the 
virus when he in fact had an undetectable viral load: 
 
With the advancements in medicine regarding HIV between 2003 and 
2008, we are unable to take judicial notice of the fact that HIV may be 
transmitted through contact with an infected individual’s blood, semen or 
vaginal fluid, and that sexual intercourse is one of the most common 
methods of passing the virus to fill in the gaps to find a factual basis for 
Rhoades’s guilty plea.141 
 
The court in State v Rhoades142 acknowledged that the level of risk may 
become so insignificant that it no longer poses a likelihood of the virus 
being transmitted. The appeal was upheld, and it was clear that there was 
no longer an acceptance, by the judiciary in Iowa, that sexual contact can 
potentially transfer the virus to another when the defendant has a low or 
undetectable viral load and this is replicated within their new statutory 
provision: 
 
‘Practical means to prevent transmission’ means substantial good faith 
compliance with a treatment regimen prescribed by the person’s health 
care provider, if applicable, and with behavioral recommendations of the 
person’s health care provider or public health officials, which may include 
but are not limited to the use of a medically indicated respiratory mask or a 
prophylactic device, to measurably limit the risk of transmission of the 
contagious or infectious disease.143 
 
The decision in Rhoades,144 and the new legislative framework in Iowa, 
represents an extremely positive incremental development for failure of 
                                                          
139 Iowa Code § 709C.1. 
140 State v Rhoades (n 104). 
141 ibid 33. 
142 ibid. 
143 Iowa Code § 709D.2 (2015). 
144 State v Rhoades (n 104). 
Criminalisation of HIV Transmission 
 
275 
proof defences, but it stands in stark contrast to other U.S. jurisdictions 
where reform is still urgently needed. No allowance has been generally 
attributed to the defendant’s viral load. In Nevada, for instance, a 
defendant with an undetectable viral load has very recently pleaded guilty 
to the statutory offence of exposing another to the virus on the basis that 
he would be convicted of a lesser charge.145 There was no consideration of 
the probative relevance of a defendant’s viral load. Similarly, in State v 
Richardson,146 a case heard in the Supreme Court of Kansas, although 
there was superficial discourse of the viral load issue, ultimately the 
defendant’s undetectable viral load was not fully considered in any real 
sense.147  
The majority of U.S. state statutes are ‘overbroad’ in that the law does not 
compartmentalise defendants into those who act in a culpable manner or 
otherwise, or reflect lack of blameworthiness on the part of individuals 
who act responsibly by ensuring that they have consistently had an 
undetectable viral load.148 Enactments are not accounting for 
advancements in preventative measures within the medical sphere. 
Newman has expressed the importance of new medication within the 
penumbra of the inculpation-exculpation equation by stipulating that the 
use of antiretroviral therapy has changed HIV from a ‘death sentence’, and 
it is unfortunate that the law has not kept up with medical 
advancements.149 The advancement in preventative medicine should, but 
has not, lead to detailed statutory amendments.150 The construction of a 
legislative framework that takes into account the concentration of the virus 
within the defendant’s blood would denote that an undetectable and 
possibly low viral load could form the basis for an affirmative failure of 
proof defence. 
 
What is apparent from our exposition of the current position in the U.S., 
with the notable exception of Iowa, is that the relevance of an undetectable 
viral load should not be left to the judiciary to consider in isolation, and 
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that it necessitates an expressly stated statutory footing. Perone has 
cogently identified the deficiencies within the U.S. standardisations of 
criminalisation for HIV transmission/exposure and submits that such 
statutory provisions: 
 
(…) produce contrary results and actually increase misconceptions about 
HIV transmission by criminalizing people with HIV regardless of a 
person’s likelihood of transmitting HIV because of condom usage, viral 
load, and/or engaging in activity with a very low or non-existent likelihood 
of transmission.151 
The United States and the Criminalisation  
and Decriminalisation of Sexual Activity 
The U.S. Presidential Commission specified that HIV+ individuals whose 
conduct posed a ‘significant risk’ of harm should be accountable for their 
actions.152 The risk of the virus being transmitted depends upon a number 
of factors including the type of sexual activity, and this has been 
confirmed by empirical studies that specify that certain types of intimacy 
pose less of a risk of transmission than other intimate acts. 
 
The reality is that a significant majority of U.S. states do not consider the 
likelihood of the virus being transmitted, and the preponderance of 
statutory provisions do not define the type of sexual activity that is to be 
prohibited.153 Thus, there is a diverse legislative framework within the 
United States on the criminalisation of HIV, and the type of prohibited 
sexual activity. For current purposes, our focus will be on two main 
categorisations: (1) states that ensure that all types of sexual activity154 are 
encapsulated by the legislation; and (2) states that have restricted, or have 
attempted to restrict, prosecutions relating to specific sexual acts.155 
 
There are a number of U.S. states that have expressly stipulated an 
extensive list of prohibited sexual activities.156 Wolf suggests that the 
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criminalisation of activities that pose no risk emanates from the 
legislators’ utilisation of the wording of other criminal offences: ‘it seems 
likely that this result is the unintentional effect of adopting definitions 
from sexual assault or rape statutes’.157 It may also have been the 
outcomes of the legislator drafting individuated statutes in a manner that 
requires a defendant to always disclose their sero-status to prospective 
partners. Whatever the motive, these provisions have been vituperatively 
criticised for failing to take into account the risk of harm,158 and they are, 
‘all consistent in one way: they do little to link the actual risk of infection 
with violation of the law.’159 These wide-ranging statutes can be surveyed 
throughout a number of states.160 Two of these states are Arkansas161 and 
Michigan,162 where the bespoke statutes, holistically drawn, encompass 
wide categorisations of potentially criminal conduct: 
 
(…) sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other 
intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s body or of any object 
into a genital or anal opening of another person’s body.163 
 
The statutory frameworks within Arkansas and Michigan engage a number 
of activities that pose virtually no risk of the virus being transmitted. The 
provisions extend culpability to conduct where an HIV+ individual may 
not have physically come into contact with the sexual organs of the 
complainant. Evidently, emphasis is placed upon the seriousness of 
infection with no consideration of the ‘actual’ risk of the virus being 
transmitted or foresight of harm occurrence. This is an affront to 
contemporary scientific literature that has reviewed the type of sexual 
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activity, and the possibility of the virus actually being transmitted.164 
There is a chasm between real and imagined risks, and Galletly and 
Pinkerton have proposed that, ‘it is unacceptable for statutes to include 
activities that pose no risk of transmission.’165 A ‘knee-jerk’ reaction to 
criminalise the transmission or exposure to the risk of HIV infection has 
occurred, unfortunately reinforcing the paradigm presumption that sexual 
activity with an HIV+ individual is itself a harm. 
 
In State v Flynn,166 by way of illustration, the inculpatory breadth of 
Michigan’s statutory provisions was unsuccessfully challenged. The case 
involved allegations of exposure due to unprotected intercourse, and the 
Court of Appeals in Michigan rejected the defendant’s contention that the 
statute was ‘too broad’, defining sexual penetration to include the use of 
‘objects’. The challenge was disregarded, as the activities that Flynn had 
partaken in were not those that he was challenging. Markman J stated that: 
 
This case, which does not involve a charge that defendant used an object to 
commit sexual penetration of the victim, requires the same conclusion. 
Defendant cannot challenge the scope of M.C.L. § 333.5210; MSA 
14.15(5210) as overbroad where his charged conduct is encompassed by 
the language of the statute.167 
 
Flynn was unable to dispute the validity of the statute, as he had been 
convicted of exposure due to unprotected intercourse, and this did not 
include the use of objects.168 The judgment has not assisted in determining 
whether the wording of the Michigan statute is appropriate. Currently, 
there have been no further appeals on the matter; it seems that any type of 
sexual exposure is within the ‘umbrella’ of potential criminalisation. 
 
A few states have adopted a more enlightened review of the harm/risk of 
harm kaleidoscopic legal prism, notably contained within the purview of 
California and Illinois perspectives. It is only the most high-risk types of 
sexual conduct that are criminalised in California and Illinois. This 
corresponds with scientific literature that acknowledges that unprotected 
sexual intercourse is most likely to transmit the virus. It also denotes a 
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reflective equipoise attached to the contemplation of harm principle.169 
The express stipulation of types of prohibited activity creates certainty, 
and enables individuals to tailor their conduct in order to engage in a 
responsible manner. 
 
The legislative responses to HIV criminalisation within California and 
Illinois propose that exposing an unsuspecting complainant to the virus 
through unprotected sexual activity may lead to a successful 
prosecution.170 In both statutory provisions, sexual activity is defined as 
unprotected anal or vaginal intercourse; clearly the conduct that is 
prohibited must pose a significant risk of harm. The restriction of 
prosecutions to unprotected activity may be seen to strike the appropriate 
balance between social utility, the probable risk of serious harm and the 
magnitude of any harm. None of these determinants appear to operate in a 
supererogatory manner as the statutory definitions afford an effective 
acknowledgement of dissonant factors. Wolf and Vezina are strong 
proponents of the Californian legislation, contending that it has struck the 
‘correct balance’ in the context of failure of proof defences.171 
 
Proponents of the Californian approach to criminalisation of HIV have 
suggested their statutory reforms present the ‘model’ code to follow in 
light of precision.172 This clarity of drafting is evident throughout the 
Californian statute as it is specific in restricting the types of exposure that 
are criminalised. It is apparent that the legislators have balanced the risk of 
harm and the magnitude of harm, and only prohibited conduct that poses a 
significant risk of harm is criminalised.173 It is for this reason that Klemm 
opines that the provision is ‘instructive’ for other state legislators.174 
 
A vignette of the prevailing uncertainty attached to sexual activity as an 
affirmative failure of proof defence is constitutively highlighted by recent 
volte-faces within the Floridian criminal justice system. The Floridian 
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legislative schema presumptively prohibits exposure through sexual 
intercourse, but recent judicial precepts from this jurisdiction have 
struggled to appropriately identify criminally restricted activities.175 The 
provision has received extensive judicial scrutiny, and sexual intercourse 
has been interpreted to be exclusive to vaginal penetration by the penis, 
but, disingenuously, to also encompass other ‘types of sexual activity’.176 
No consideration has been made to statistical probability of transmission 
within any of the conflicted state judgments. In State v L.A.P.,177 a case 
where the defendant exposed the unsuspecting complainant to the virus 
through oral intercourse and digital penetration, the Court of Appeal in 
Florida held that sexual intercourse was exclusive to vaginal penetration 
by the penis.178 Two further appellate decisions have since extended the 
definition of sexual intercourse to include anal, vaginal and oral 
intercourse. In State v D.C.,179 the appellate court interpreted the statute so 
that it included all of the aforementioned activities. The definition from 
D.C. was affirmed by the majority in State v Debaun,180 but Shepherd C.J., 
in a powerful dissenting judgment, suggested that the majority had 
mistakenly neglected to consider previous decisions, and inaptly utilised a 
dictionary definition of sexual intercourse. 
 
Judicial conflict in determining the applicable definition of sexual 
intercourse within Florida signifies again the requirement of any 
legislative framework to provide interpretative precision and certainty, and 
that this must also correlate with the probability of the risk occurring.181 
An appropriately worded statute should clarify the parameters of criminal 
activity, with no attendant ambiguity as to what will be considered to be 
culpable conduct, as we set out subsequently. Culpability should only be 
based upon activities that, ‘reach a certain threshold’,182 and that 
‘threshold’, in cases of exposure, should only be the riskiest activities; 
there have been no reported cases of the virus being transmitted through 
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oral intercourse.183 The demarcation line must be unprotected anal and 
vaginal intercourse, even though there are permutations depending upon 
who is the receptive or insertive partner. 
 
There are substantial variations as to what will equate to culpable sexual 
activity within the differentiated legal state jurisdictions of the United 
States. Provisions that have facilitated all types of sexual activity within 
the penumbra of potential criminalisation may be described as ‘too broad’, 
and as there is no consideration of statistical probability of the virus being 
transmitted. While it is conceded that HIV can be a life-debilitating virus, 
and therefore the magnitude of harm is particularly relevant, it must be 
offset with the probability/risk of harm factorisation. At some point, the 
risk of transmission must be considered immaterial for criminalisation 
purposes, as acknowledged in California. 
Conclusions 
The issue of condom use, viral loads and type of sexual activity have not 
been directly raised as failure of proof defences before the English courts, 
but have been addressed within the Canadian and American legal systems. 
The distinction may be attributed to the fact that all cases within England 
have involved transmission of the virus, whilst in Canada and the United 
States, transmission is not a requirement for criminalisation. It is 
regrettable that the majority of those jurisdictions have not enacted 
legislation that would facilitate the defence of condom use and viral load, 
or would restrict culpability to certain types of sexual activity, and a new 
statutory pathway is urgently needed to reflect altered societal 
expectations, and appropriate thresholds of blame worthiness, fault and 
risk of harm temporal individuation. 
 
Legislation is the appropriate rectification as a cathartic panacea for 
current problems, consequently eliminating the uncertainty that is evident 
within England and Canada, and avoiding retrospectivity challenges. 
Extant common law in both countries demonstrates that the use of non-
specific HIV precepts attached to criminalisation simply promotes ad hoc 
interpretative measures with the unfortunate need to seek recourse in 
judicial divining rods; hardly a satisfactory response to significant criminal 
law/public health arguments. Legislative initiatives per se, however, have 
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not provided logical consistency or clarity within the U.S. state laws, and a 
multiplicity of definitional constructs of liability are contained in the 
divergent provisions, but no structured template as to offence-definition 
modification. The multi-faceted provisions, as stated herein, provide an 
important comparative contextualisation for the review and optimisation of 
approach: Illinois for accommodating condom use in a bespoke 
affirmative provision; Iowa for statutory promulgation of viral load 
considerations; and California for sexual activity standardisations. In 
general, however, specific U.S. state legislators have omitted to consider 
important scientific data; any new legislation needs to develop with this 
contemporary awareness.184 Any proposed legislation needs to specify that 
factorisations of condom use, viral load or type of sexual activity within 
defined circumstances and parameters could be utilised as a defence.185 
This would enable HIV+ individuals to continue to engage in sexual 
activity without the fear of prosecution or rejection, and they would not 
generally be required to disclose their status within the boundaries of a 
new offence-definition modification. 
 
It is unfortunate that the English courts have not taken the opportunity to 
clarify their position, although it is conceded that some of the issues were 
not identified or raised at the time of Dica or Konzani. It is suggested that 
the orthodoxy adopted in Canada, before the Supreme Court decision in 
Mabior, represents a preferred approach to the criminalisation of the 
sexual exposure/transmission to HIV. Allowing these defences would 
promote safe sexual practices and be in line with public health policies 
initiatives,186 the ultimate goal being to reduce transmission of the virus. 
 
Our proposed legislative failure of proof response to criminalisation of 
HIV constitutively promotes condom use and low viral load defences, and 
considers that certain types of sexual activity should be precluded from 
criminal sanctions. De novo legislation in relation to viral load must be 
constructed in a manner that promotes the administration of anti-retroviral 
medication. The benefits of this are twofold: it will encourage individuals 
to get tested; and encourage defendants to achieve an undetectable viral 
load. An optimal reform model for failure of proof defences may be stated 
in the following definitive terms: 
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The offences:  
A person will have committed an offence under this statute if he: 
 
(1) Intentionally or recklessly transmits HIV to another by having 
unprotected vaginal or anal intercourse; or, 
(2) Intentionally exposes another to HIV by having unprotected vaginal or 
anal intercourse 
Defences 
Protective Measures: Condom Use 
Only the correct and consistent use of condoms (protective measures) will 
form the basis of a defence to the criminal acts of intentional exposure and 
reckless transmission of HIV. 
Viral Load 
An accused will not be considered to have exposed/transmitted the virus to 
another if he had a non-infectious viral load at the time of the sexual act. 
 
In order to establish that the accused had a non-infectious viral load, the 
sexual act must have transpired after advice from a medical professional 
that he was non-infectious. 
 
The wording of the suggested legislative defence of condom use ensures 
that a defendant can rely upon the exculpatory nature, but may still be held 
accountable if they are not used correctly or consistently. This would 
ensure that defendants are aware that their use may exonerate them from 
criminal sanctions, and encourage the correct use of these protective 
measures. It is also an acceptance that there may be a chance of the virus 
being transmitted; in practical terms this is unlikely to transpire, but the 
mechanism is in place if transmission occurs. This may also indirectly 
encourage disclosure by the defendant. 
 
The preponderance of medical studies encourages the exclusion of a non-
infectious viral load from the ambit of criminal sanctions. The first 
subsection articulates that the defendant can assert that he had a low or 
undetectable viral load at the time of the sexual contact. This avoids any 
ambiguity in relation to the defence. It also anticipates that the defendant 
has an evidentiary burden to establish that he had a low or undetectable 
viral load. This will be a relatively undemanding burden to discharge as 
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the defendants’ medical records will confirm their viral load at that time, 
and will not contravene the defendant’s presumption of innocence. The 
second element of the suggested statutory provision relies upon Idaho’s 
recognition that the advice must emanate from a legal professional, 
ensuring that there is a formal requirement to the defence, and much 
needed consistency and certainty. Contrary to recent Law Commission 
perspectives, a bespoke legislative response is needed to address the 
overbroad criminalisation of HIV transmission, and to propagate 
appropriate failure of proof defences. 
